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Trust and Transparency in Contact Tracing
Applications
Stacy Hobson, Michael Hind, Aleksandra Mojsilovic´ and Kush R. Varshney
Abstract—The global outbreak of COVID-19 has led to focus
on efforts to manage and mitigate the continued spread of the
disease. One of these efforts include the use of contact tracing to
identify people who are at-risk of developing the disease through
exposure to an infected person. Historically, contact tracing has
been primarily manual but given the exponential spread of the
virus that causes COVID-19, there has been significant interest
in the development and use of digital contact tracing solutions
to supplement the work of human contact tracers. The collection
and use of sensitive personal details by these applications has
led to a number of concerns by the stakeholder groups with
a vested interest in these solutions. We explore digital contact
tracing solutions in detail and propose the use of a transparent
reporting mechanism, FactSheets, to provide transparency of and
support trust in these applications. We also provide an example
FactSheet template with questions that are specific to the contact
tracing application domain.
I. MOTIVATION
THE recent spread of Severe Acute Respiratory SyndromeCoronovirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and the outbreak of the
associated COVID-19 disease has inspired the development
of new software applications and AI models to address many
of the challenges our global society is facing. Public health
agencies, corporations, and individuals have been racing to
identify tools to help control the spread of the virus, find
suitable treatment options, and aid in the creation of a vaccine.
Given the public health impact and urgent need to limit the
continued spread of the disease, many government officials and
policy makers have relaxed regulations to expedite the launch
of technologies addressing these and other related concerns.
Many of these technologies collect and use sensitive data about
individuals such as health history, medical conditions, infec-
tion state, current health symptoms, and location. An example
includes Contact Tracing Applications - those focused on
identifying individuals who are at risk for developing COVID-
19 through exposure to a person later identified as having
been infected with SARS-CoV-2. Contact tracing applications
use various techniques to identify exposure or contact events,
and use sensitive personal data like some of the examples
previously identified.
The use of sensitive personal information has prompted
concerns about the overall trustworthiness of these types of
applications. These concerns have motivated interest in appli-
cation transparency, so that application stakeholders can better
understand details including the purpose of the application, the
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data that is collected and the application’s use of the collected
data.
In recent years there has been significant discussion around
the need for transparent reporting, specifically with regards
to AI models and services. We apply one of the recent
transparent reporting techniques in the context of contact
tracing applications. Although this category of applications
are not considered AI, there is significant risk to the end-users
of the applications given the health implications and use of
sensitive personal data. Studies have shown that technologies
that are applied in a healthcare or a public health setting can
lead to negative outcomes like medical errors, harm, or death
especially if they are poorly designed, implemented, or applied
[1]. The limited understanding of details of these applications
motivates a need for transparency to support trust.
The objective of this paper is to identify how we develop
and use transparent reporting mechanisms for Contact Tracing
applications. We do not aim to make direct conclusions
about the trustworthiness of specific applications but focus
on the types of questions that must be addressed to provide
transparency of and support trust in the applications in this
domain.
II. TRANSPARENT REPORTING MECHANISMS
Researchers in the software engineering community have
focused on creating useful documentation for applications.
They have identified quality issues in existing documentation
for conventional systems [2], [3], [4] and discussed problems
such as missing rationales for design decisions, too few
examples to understand how to use a module or package, lack
of overviews to illustrate how a systems component parts work
as a whole, and insufficient guidance on how to map usage
scenarios to elements of an API.
AI applications pose a unique challenge, given their reliance
on training data, and their often probabilistic behavior with
respect to test data. Thus, there has been a recent focus on
transparent reporting mechanisms for AI systems, focusing on
datasets [5], [6], [7], models [8], [9] and services [8]. There
have been efforts focused on the ethical development of AI
that also highlighted the need for transparency or detailed
assessments of AI systems [10].
We build upon these efforts of transparent reporting to
examine and provide transparency of contact tracing appli-
cations.
III. COVID-19 AND CONTACT TRACING
SARS-CoV-2 poses a significant health challenge for global
communities in that there are currently no identified vaccines
2or accepted proactive treatment methods for COVID-19, the
disease the virus causes. Limiting the spread of the virus
has emerged as one of the primary targets to reduce the
occurrence of COVID-19, and the impact on individuals and
the overburdened healthcare system in many countries. Two
of the measures used to reduce the spread are 1) limiting
the physical interactions and contact between people (social
distancing) and 2) identification of people who have come
into contact with or proximity of an infected person (contact
tracing).
Contact tracing has been used for many years as a method
to control disease and has primarily relied on mobilization of
trained human contact tracers - people who actively work with
individuals with confirmed infections to generate a list of peo-
ple whom they may have further exposed or infected [11]. The
contact tracers then notify each of the identified individuals of
the exposure risk, encourage them to get tested for infection,
and suggest potential immediate quarantine action. If any of
those individuals are infected, the tracers begin the process of
creating an exposure contact list for each of those people for
further notification and action.
Manual contact tracing efforts are likely not sufficient in
cases where the spread of the disease has been exponential, as
we have seen with SARS-CoV-2. The initial doubling of cases
in China was reported at every 6.4 days before advanced mit-
igation methods were employed [12]. A recent publication by
Johns Hopkins University Center for Health Security reports
that the United States will need to add approximately 100,000
human contact tracers as part of the multi-pronged effort to
manage the COVID-19 epidemic [13].
One way to scale contact tracing efforts and complement
the work of human contact tracers is through the use of
digital contact tracing solutions. The United States Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identifies two types of
digital contact tracing solutions - one focused on streamlining
the capture and management of data on cases and contacts,
the other on using Bluetooth or GPS to track an individuals
exposure to an infected person [14]. The approach we use for
transparency can be applied to both solution types, however,
we focus our remaining discussion on the most prevalent of
the application types - those that fall into the latter category.
A. Digital Contact Tracing Techniques
There is not an agreed upon single way to achieve contact
tracing; at the time of writing this paper, we identified 30
contact tracing applications available worldwide. Many of
these applications establish contact events by keeping a record
of all the devices (e.g. smartphones) that come within a certain
distance of one another or are in the same geographical
location at the same time. Once a person has been identi-
fied as infected with COVID-19 and has indicated it in the
application, a notification can be sent to all other devices
running the same application that indicated close proximity
to the device of the infected person within a set date range.
These details are used to infer a contact event - that one or
more people were close enough to an infected individual where
respiratory droplets could pass from the infected person to
the others. The most common approaches for digital contact
tracing rely on either the use of location tracking through the
global positioning service (GPS) or Bluetooth Low Energy
capabilities.
Most smartphones today continuously capture details on the
device’s location and the associated time via GPS satellites.
GPS-enabled devices are reported to work best when they are
outdoors under open skies where they can accurately capture
location within 16 feet [15]. Location accuracy is known to
degrade when devices are indoors, underground, or near items
that obstruct a direct path to the satellites, e.g. buildings,
bridges, or trees [15]. GPS-based location tracking for a device
is achieved through trilateration using radio signals from GPS
satellites. The resulting coordinates indicating geographical
location are paired with a timestamp to represent location at a
specific time. Contact tracing applications infer contact events
by 1) identifying devices that have geographical coordinates
that fall within a set distance parameter (e.g. 6 or 10 feet),
2) has a time-stamp that overlaps with one another and
3) continues to remain within the distance parameter for a
specified duration (e.g. 15 minutes) even if the geographical
coordinates between one or both change. This inference also
relies on certain assumptions including that the device is
always in a person’s possession and that possession is by a
single person. A contrary case includes when the device is
not in someone’s possession, for example it is left somewhere
(on the seat on a train, a table in a restaurant, etc.). The
device’s location (and not that of the person) would be tracked
and a faulty contact event can be reported. Similarly, if a
device owner or primary user lets someone else (friend, family
member, etc.) use the device and the owner is later found to
be infected, the exposure of others may be reported for cases
where the infected individual was not present. Additionally,
the challenge posed by inaccuracies for device use indoors
may limit the ability to identify a significant portion of contact
events and has been identified as a potential shortcoming of
using GPS location tracking for this particular purpose.
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) capabilities can be used to
establish contact events though proximity detection. Most
smartphones are equipped with bluetooth capabilities that
are leveraged for this method of contact tracing and, unlike
GPS, can track proximity events indoors or outdoors. Since
bluetooth is used to track the promixity to other bluetooth-
enabled devices, it does not track actual location. This has
been considered one of the limitations of this method since it
cannot assist in identification of geographical areas where the
virus is spreading.
In a contact tracing context, Bluetooth Low Energy is used
to broadcast information from a device including a time stamp
and an identifier. Since Bluetooth Low Energy is based on
short-range communications only devices that are within a
short distance are expected to receive the broadcast. The
receiving device uses the received signal strength indicator
to infer distance between itself and the broadcasting device.
A recent tech report highlights issues with relying on signal
strength as an estimator of distance. The authors showed that
the signal strength varied substantially based on the orientation
of the device, absorption of the signal by the human body, and
3reflection or absorption of radio signals in buildings and trains
[16].
Another fundamental difference between GPS-based loca-
tion tracking and proximity identification through Bluetooth
Low Energy is in how the data related to potential contact
events are stored. GPS-based location tracking relies on cen-
tralization of data to a remote server while the Bluetooth Low
Energy technique can be either centralized or decentralized,
with data being shared only locally on the individual devices.
Other, lesser-discussed methods for contact tracing solutions
may involve the use of bluetooth beacons [17], location
tracking through cellular or wi-fi, or tag scanning (e.g. QR
or RFID). These techniques can be implemented as the sole
method for contact identification or in combination with one
of the other techniques.
Although these techniques can be used to identify potential
contact events, they do not factor in pertinent details that
can affect transmission likelihood. For example, transmission
within an indoor, poorly ventilated space may be more likely
than transmission in an outdoor space [18]. Additionally, ap-
propriate use of items like medical-grade masks or respirators
by one or more individuals can greatly reduce likelihood of
transmission during contact events.
We are not suggesting that one method is better than the
other; we only present a brief introduction of the techniques
since aspects of the technical implementation are important
considerations for stakeholders interested in application trans-
parency.
IV. APPLICATION STAKEHOLDERS
Contact tracing has been identified as critical to the ability to
manage the COVID-19 pandemic and, along with significant
testing capabilities, may be a required item to enable gov-
ernments to relax measures in place that limit the movement
of their citizens [19], [20]. These measures have negatively
impacted global economies given the effect the restrictions
have on businesses in industries such as retail, hospitality, and
travel & transportation. Multiple stakeholders are interested
in the development and use of contact tracing applications
and the underlying motivations for this interest may differ for
each group. Understanding some of the motivations for the
stakeholders provides a foundation for identifying the expected
benefits and concerns of use of these applications.
A. Public Health Officials
One category of stakeholders includes those with a public
health role - officials in organizations with a focus on the
identification and management of viruses like SARS-CoV-2.
Examples of these organizations are the CDC in the United
States and Ministries of Health in other countries. They have
an interest in digital contact tracing solutions as a complement
to manual contact tracing efforts that many of them have
employed for decades, with a goal of using these techniques
to mitigate disease spread.
B. Health Care Providers
A second group includes health care providers - hospitals,
long- and short-term care facilities, and laboratories. Their
interests also include the management of the virus but extend
to use of the applications for reporting of infected cases from
their patients and appropriate handling of people who have
been notified of potential exposure. The health care provider
and public health groups, along with government officials,
likely also have interests in using applications to identify ’hot
spots’ or locations where the spread of the virus is growing.
This information can be used in tailoring localized measures
aimed at reducing the continued spread.
C. Public and Private Companies
Many public and private companies have interests in digital
contact tracing applications as part of the efforts in allowing
their employees to return to a physical worksite. Since the
start of the pandemic, many governments have instituted
measures to encourage or mandate that their citizens remain
at home with exceptions being allowed for those in essential
roles, e.g. health care staff, public safety officials, and critical
infrastructure work in specific industries [21]. Digital contact
tracing applications can be used to identify exposures within
an office setting and enable employers to recommend exposed
individuals quarantine at home to reduce worksite-associated
outbreaks. Additionally, employees that have been notified
of potential exposure through non-work related activities can
communicate the exposure identification their employer and
self-quarantine to prevent spread.
D. IT Professionals
Software developers and information technology profes-
sionals are often the groups that are responsible for the
development of contact tracing applications. People within
this group may have interests in developing their own solu-
tions for contact tracing to make available to the stakeholder
groups mentioned above. There are often government and
geographical considerations that apply to the applications, so
the potential for adoption of an existing application by a
different country may require updates by software developers
to make them adhere to specific local policies or regulations.
E. General Public
The final stakeholder group we identify here includes the
individuals that are expected to actively use contact tracing
applications. This could be individuals in a certain country,
state, or geography, or in a business context, the business’
employees. Trust in the applications by the target end-users
is critical for effective adoption, especially in cases where
application usage is not mandated.
V. BENEFITS AND CONCERNS
The use of digital contact tracing applications is expected to
provide a variety of benefits but also brings to mind a number
of concerns including those relating to privacy and security.
The means in which the concerns are handled may differ given
the technical design and implementation of each application.
4A. Benefits
One key benefit of contact tracing that applies to both
manual efforts and digital applications is the ability to identify
people who are exposed to an infected individual to encourage
testing and quarantine. The implementation of a quarantine
action for people who are infected but are pre-symptomatic
or asymptomatic reduces the chance of them infecting others
prior to awareness of their own infected state. Recent studies
have suggested the median incubation period for COVID-19 is
about 5.1 days [22] and that a portion of the spread of SARS-
COV-2 is from pre-symptomatic [23], [24] or asymptomatic
individuals [24], [25]. Therefore, the identification and quar-
antining of pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic people may be
a useful factor in reducing the continued COVID-19 infections.
Digital solutions may also provide additional benefits above
that of manual contact tracing methods. Some of these addi-
tional benefits include:
1) Faster notification of exposure: Digital solutions can
help reduce the time for notification to exposed individuals as
compared to manual contact tracing. Apps can notify exposed
people within seconds after an infected person has been
identified. Manual tracing efforts require several steps after the
identification of an infected individual, including completing
an interview with the infected person or close family members
to collect names of the people potentially exposed, potential
additional time to locate a means to contact each person (phone
numbers, addresses, etc.), and the time to establish contact.
2) Identification of contact in public spaces: Contact trac-
ing applications may also help address areas where manual
contact tracing is not effective, for example in identifying
prolonged contact with strangers or in public spaces. A specific
example of this would be an asymptomatic individual traveling
via public transportation or waiting in line in a coffee shop.
The individual would not be able to identify most of the
people he/she/they came into contact with. Additionally, if the
individual could recall the exact day, time, and duration of the
visit, this still would not be sufficient to identify and locate
all others that were in the same location at the same time.
3) Identifying outbreak ‘hot spots’: Contact tracing solu-
tions that capture location details in association with infections
and exposures may be useful in identifying areas where 1)
infections are growing, 2) the number of cases exceed a
threshold, or 3) congregations of large groups of people are
enabling rapid transmission. This information may be used
in implementing countermeasures like social distancing and
shelter-in-place policies targeted at specific locations to reduce
the increase in infections within that geographical area.
B. Concerns
Discussions around the potential for use of digital contact
tracing applications have brought light to a large number of
concerns with the technologies, chief of which is focused on
privacy. We maintain that transparency of the technologies
through an understanding of how each addresses the concerns
is a foundation for building trust and enabling stakeholders to
make decisions about which technologies they want to use and
how they want to use it. Some of the main concerns with the
solutions include:
1) Privacy: At the core of digital contact tracing is the
awareness of personal information such as health status (in-
fected or not infected), location details, social interactions, and
in some cases name, gender, age, and health history (self-
reported symptoms and medical conditions). The collection of
these details pose a number of issues such as the potential for
an individual’s sensitive data to be made available to others
(intentionally or unintentionally) and use by governments or
other groups for purposes other than management of COVID-
19 spread. Some practical privacy concerns are the opportu-
nities for government agencies such as law enforcement or
organizations like the United States’ Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agency to surveil people through their use
of the application and the potential for others to find out about
their health conditions including COVID-19 infection.
2) Security: Another top concern for application stakehold-
ers is application security. This includes two aspects: a) the
vulnerability of the applications to attack with an attempt to
change how the application works, to access personal data,
or to disable usage of the application and b) the embedding
of code for nefarious purposes by an application developer
or publisher. The 2020 Data Breach Investigations report by
Verizon identified web applications as the second highest
category of healthcare industry breaches after miscellaneous
errors [26]. An example of a specific security issue with a
contact tracing application was highlighted in a recent report
by Amnesty International, in which they stated that they
were able to access individuals’ names, health status, and
location details from a central server for the Qatar government-
sponsored digital contact tracing application EHTERAZ [27].
3) Coverage: The technical implementation of the appli-
cations also affects the expectation of deployment and use.
For example, applications using Bluetooth Low Energy may
require many people in the specific community or location
to download and use to adequately assess potential spread
amongst the population. If there is not enough coverage of
use across the population, the ability to identify many of the
exposed people is reduced. We understand that people may
have varying reasons for choosing to participate or not, one
of which is their belief of trustworthiness of the applications
based on many of the specific concerns highlighted here.
4) Access: A key requirement for digital contact tracing
is that individuals have devices (e.g. smartphones) that en-
able the application to function properly. Since many of the
applications rely on BLE or GPS, individuals would have to
have devices that have the capabilities embedded. Results of
a 2019 survey showed that approximately 53% of the people
aged 65 or older in the United States have a smartphone while
ownership of those between ages 18 and 49 was greater than
90% [28]. Also, for some of the systems, a newer version
of a smartphone is required; people with older smartphones
may not have the ability to use or get alerts from these types
of applications. Since the identification of contact events for
individuals are based on these devices, children and disadvan-
taged groups may also be omitted given a lack of access to or
continued use of a personal smartphone. Countries like India
and Indonesia have large portions of the population that either
do not have access to a compatible device or have a device at
5all [29].
5) Accuracy: We introduced some of the issues related
to accuracy earlier in the discussion, specifically the limita-
tions with tracing contact in large locations (e.g. apartment
buildings) and areas where people are more geographically
separated. We highlighted a concern with GPS previously in
that it is not as accurate indoors or in areas where there
isn’t an unimpeded path to open skies. With BLE, accuracy
may degrade based on the positioning or obstruction of the
bluetooth enabled device and this may impact the proximity
identification [16].
6) Asynchronous contact events: There is potential for
exposure and spread of the virus from cases where there is
an asynchronous contact event, for example with a person
being in a small enclosed space (e.g. elevator) for a period
of time then leaves, and then shortly thereafter another person
comes into the same space. There is the belief that most of
the spread of the virus is through aspiration of respiratory
droplets however there is also the possibility that spread occurs
when an uninfected person touches an object or surface that
an infected person has previously touched and then puts their
hands or fingers in the areas around their mouths, nose, or
eyes. Both of these examples of spread can occur through an
asynchronous contact event but may not be captured as such
in digital contact tracing solutions that focus on people being
in the same location or close proximity at the same time.
7) Device impacts: Each contact tracing application may
also have specific considerations and impacts on the devices in
which they are being run. There is a concern with the potential
of high consumption of battery power with bluetooth-based
techniques [30]. Some of the applications have requirements
to run in the foreground of the device, meaning that when
other applications are being used by the device holder, the
application may not be able to work appropriately to identify
contact events. Additionally, the device makers may have
restrictions in place that effect the way the applications work.
One example of this is Apple’s restriction on allowing blue-
tooth transmissions when an iOS based device is locked [30],
which limits the functionality of contact tracing applications
on these devices.
8) Ability: These applications rely not only on adoption
by individuals but also appropriate use. If people are unaware
of specific requirements for use, or are not comfortable with
usage of the device or the application, their interactions may
not be sufficient to enable effectiveness of the application.
Consider an example where a novice technology user has a
smartphone and downloads the application on it. The user may
not realize that downloading the application is not sufficient,
but may also require completion of a profile and providing
consent for the application to run on the user’s device. Consent
may also be required in the device settings to allow the
application to access some of the smartphone’s capabilities
that are required. For example, a user may install an appli-
cation but inadvertently restrict the ability for it to work by
disabling access to the device’s location services or bluetooth
capabilities.
9) Interoperability: Limitations associated with contact
tracing applications’ ability to identify contact events may
lead to missed episodes of exposure and potential transmission
of the virus. We have highlighted some of these concerns
relating to the coverage, access, and accuracy aspects already.
Another related concern of the application’s ability to identify
contact is that of interoperability between applications and/or
devices. Consider an example where an infected individual
is located near another individual for an extended period of
time. If the two people are running different contact tracing
applications, or running applications on different devices (e.g.
one with an Android based device and the other with an
iOS based device) restrictions in the applications being able
to share details with one another or from one platform to
another is a direct inhibitor to the identification of this contact
event. Apple and Alphabet (Google’s parent company) have
proposed a framework that allows interoperability between the
device operating systems of contact tracing applications, which
is a helpful step in addressing this issue, but is limited to
the applications that use the framework [31]. In some cases,
applications like Aarogya Setu have developed both a version
based on the Android and the iOS operating systems [32].
10) Reluctance in disclosure: In some cases people may
agree or are mandated to use a digital contact tracing applica-
tion but have an interest in withholding an infection diagnosis
because of privacy or security concerns, or personal reluctance
to acknowledge the diagnosis. Similarly, people may not
want to acknowledge or disclose their exposure to infected
individuals. In some geographies, people who are diagnosed as
infected or are identified as having been exposed to an infected
individual may be told to quarantine for a period of time.
These measures will limit people’s movements and ability to
do things that they may want to do e.g. go to work, go to the
grocery store, visit family members, or participate in social
activities. Some of these limitations may have an economic
impact (restricting ability to work) which may reinforce a
reluctance for an individual to disclose infection or exposure.
VI. CURRENT CONTACT TRACING APPLICATIONS
The urgent global need for contact tracing has spurred
the development of many digital solutions. To date, we have
identified 30 different applications created since December
2019 specifically to support the contact tracing needs required
for management of COVID-19. These solutions may differ
in technical implementation and specific policies of use. It is
likely hard for public health agencies and government officials
to quickly identify the differences between applications as they
try to determine which one to select as part of their targeted
virus management strategy. Similarly, it is also difficult for
individuals who are asked to install and use the applications
to get consumable details regarding specific considerations
relevant to them like requirements for use, types of data
collected, and data use policies.
We provide a list of the 30 applications in Table I including
details on the organization that sponsored the development or
group that directly developed the application, and the technical
approach that is used for identifying contact. These details are
based on information reported for each of the applications
at the time of authorship of this paper, but we acknowledge
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EXAMPLES OF CONTACT TRACING APPLICATIONS
Application Developer or Sponsoring
Organization
Tracing
Technique
Aarogya Setu Government of India GPS
Apturi Covid Private Developers (Latvia) Bluetooth
Corona100m Private Developer (South Ko-
rea)
GPS
coEpi Private Developer (United
States)
Bluetooth
Coronika Kreativzirkel (Germany) Manual
COVA Punjab Government of Punjab (India) GPS
CovidSafe University of Washington
(United States)
Bluetooth
CovidSafe Australian Government (Aus-
tralia)
Bluetooth
Covid Watch University consortium
(United States)
GPS
EHTERAZ Ministry of Interior (Qatar) GPS and Blue-
tooth
eRouka Czech Ministry of Health and
Hygiene (Czech Republic)
Bluetooth
HaMagen Israel Ministry of Health (Is-
rael)
GPS
Immuni Italian Central Government
(Italy)
Bluetooth
Ito Private consortium
(Germany)
Bluetooth
Health Code Alibaba (China) GPS
Social
Monitoring
Infogorod (Russia) GPS
Mahakavach Government of Maharashtra
(India)
GPS
NHSX NHS Digital (UK) Bluetooth
NOVID Carnegie Mellon University
(United States)
Bluetooth
Private Kit: Safe
Paths
MIT (United States) GPS
ProteGO Ministry of Digital Affairs
(Poland)
Bluetooth
Rakning C-19 Icelands Department of Civil
Protection and Emergency
Management
GPS
Smittestopp Norwegian Institute of Public
Health (Norway)
GPS
StopCovid Government of France
(France)
Bluetooth
StopKorona! Ministry of Health (North
Macedonia)
Bluetooth
Stopp Corona Austria Red Cross (Austria) Bluetooth
Swiss Covid Federal Office of Public
Health (Switzerland)
Bluetooth
TraceTogether Government Technology
Agency (Singapore)
Bluetooth
Triax Private consortium (United
States)
Tag Scanning
ZeroBase ZeroBase Foundation (United
States)
QR Code Scan-
ning
that due to the dynamic nature in the development of these
applications and efforts to address emerging concerns of the
intended community of use, some of these details may change
in the future.
VII. FACTSHEET TEMPLATE FOR CONTACT TRACING
As a follow-on to our prior work on the use of FactSheets
for transparent reporting [8], we now aim to help identify the
questions that would provide useful and critical information
about contact tracing applications.
To achieve this goal, we first compiled questions that are
relevant to provide basic information relative to any model,
service or application. These include questions focused on
scope of use, target stakeholders, and data that is collected.
Then, after detailed review of contact tracing technologies and
their potential for use, we augmented the initial list with ques-
tions specific to contact tracing, namely, those that would elicit
details addressing the benefits and concerns identified above.
Some of these questions focus on the technical implementation
including the technique used for establishing proximity and/or
location, method for identifying a contact event (centralization
versus decentralization), and method for infection reporting.
As a final step, we considered the beneficiaries of the applica-
tions and questions that would be of interest to them that were
not already identified. Examples of these questions include
how infections are reported, whether usage is voluntary or
mandated, and how compliance with local laws or regulations
is achieved.
These efforts enabled us to create a FactSheet template - a
list of questions that can be used to provide important details
on and promote transparency of contact tracing applications.
The FactSheet template we created is organized into four
main categories: General Questions, Data-specific Questions,
Privacy Questions, and Use Questions. We introduce the
template and the associated questions in Tables II–V.
TABLE II
CONTACT TRACING FACTSHEET TEMPLATE: GENERAL ITEMS
General
What is the scope of use of the application?
Who are the target stakeholders or beneficiaries of the application - the
people who will be impacted by its success or failure (e.g. government
or public health agencies, private companies, and/or individuals)?
What policies or laws apply to the development, deployment or
usage of this application? How do you ensure compliance with these
regulations?
Is this application intended for stand-alone use or as a companion to
established health-agency or government manual tracing efforts?
Does this application connect to any other applications or IT systems
(for example, public health, clinical laboratory, or hospital systems)?
Identify the technique used for establishing contact (bluetooth, location
tracking via GPS, etc.)
What are the specific requirements for efficacy of tracking and contact
identification?
Distance the span of space that is used to identify a contact event
Time amount of time individuals are within the required distance to
meet threshold for exposure risk
Coverage the number of people or percent of population needed to
use the app
What concerns (positive and negative) might the beneficiaries have in
how the service works? How are these concerns addressed?
VIII. DISCUSSION
We have presented a broad FactSheet template to support
transparency of contact tracing applications. A key component
of FactSheets is the tailoring of the questions within the
FactSheet template to address a specific stakeholder group and
provide clarity on the aspects of the applications that they
are most concerned about. As we discussed in Section IV,
the motivations of interest in the applications may differ for
each group, and these motivations influence the questions that
enable transparency for each group.
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CONTACT TRACING FACTSHEET TEMPLATE: DATA ITEMS
Data
What data is collected by the application? Include data collected
directly by the app, from the user, and data accessed from other
applications/system.
Is this data combined with any additional details about an individual,
community, locale, or environment?
Identify any data collected that is of a sensitive nature (for example,
health conditions, symptoms, etc.)
How is the collected data used?
Who has rights to access the data (explicitly define people, agencies,
and/or organizations)
What is the policy on data retention and deletion?
Is there potential for the data provided or collected to be used
for future purposes, beyond the scope of the current intended use?
What mechanisms do you implement to limit use beyond scope of the
intended purpose?
What mechanisms are used to keep the data secure?
TABLE IV
CONTACT TRACING FACTSHEET TEMPLATE: USE ITEMS
Use
What are the device requirements for use of the application? (for
example, required platform, operating system, wifi, and/or cellular
access, date of manufacture)
Is use of this application voluntary (opt-in) or mandatory?
If mandated, do users have the ability to opt-out?
If users opt-out, what is the policy on deletion of details on their use
and associated data from the system?
Is user consent collected for the use of the application?
Is user consent requested for access to or collection of the explicit
user data (personal, health, and/or location-related details)?
Are contact episodes identified in a decentralized (locally on each
device) or centralized (remotely through a server) manner?
How is infection being reported - self-reported or reported from an
established health system (public health, clinical laboratory, hospital,
or other COVID-19 management system)?
If self-reported, how does the user indicate infection? Is the identifi-
cation by the user authenticated in some way?
If reported from an established health system, how is the information
shared and received?
What is the expected impact on the devices that use this app? (battery
use, compute, and bandwidth considerations)
What are specific considerations for use of the particular application?
Include details on any technical concerns or shortcomings.
What are the limitations of use? List scenarios for which use is not
suitable (e.g. incompatibility with certain devices, inability to identify
non-contact barriers like walls separating locations within a building)
Let’s consider the General Public stakeholder group whose
interest in transparency may be most related to their own use
of the applications. The questions that focus on data, privacy
and device requirements may be the ones that are critical
for their specific version of the FactSheet template. Some
of these questions would include those relating to 1) types
of data collected, 2) how the data is used, 3) requirements
for efficacy of tracking and contact identification, 4) expected
device impacts, 5) limitations of use, and 6) data privacy.
The Public Health official group would potentially be en-
gaged in the selection and management of the contact tracing
applications for a specific geographical area (city, county, state,
county, etc.) and therefore would likely have interest in the
broadest set of questions from the template above. The full
set of questions we identified in the template would provide
information pertaining to the concerns from all stakeholder
TABLE V
CONTACT TRACING FACTSHEET TEMPLATE: PRIVACY ITEMS
Privacy
Did you implement the right for a user to 1) withdraw consent, 2)
object, and 3) be forgotten in the application?
Does the application allow people to learn any personal information
about others?
Are privacy-preserving techniques incorporated in the application (e.g.
data anonymization, encryption, aggregation)? If so, provide details
on the techniques used.
What additional measures are used to protect the data and identity of
infected and exposed individuals?
Could this application be used in a way that identifies people who are
infected or at risk to 1) the developers, 2) people within an individual’s
social circles, 3) to those the app is warning about contact and
potential exposure, or 4) to the government, employer, or managing
organization?
If the app connects to public health or hospital systems, how do you
ensure that personal information isnt accessible during data sharing
points?
groups, and this could be useful as the Public Health officials
evaluate and select the applications with the other stakeholders
concerns in mind. However, they might be less interested in
questions relating to specific device impacts or requirements of
use unless these considerations could greatly limit acceptance
in their geographical communities.
For the IT Professionals group, questions around the tech-
nical implementation, limitations, connections to other IT
systems, all data aspects (collection, policies, access rights,
retention, and security), device requirements, decentralization
versus centralization, and privacy-preserving techniques would
be of particular interest. This group may also be interested in
additional technical details about the applications including
access to the code base. Recent reports have suggested that
the code for two of the applications referenced in Table I -
Aarogya Setu and TraceTogether - will be publicly available as
open source projects [33], [34]. We believe that this is another
path for promoting transparency of these types of applications
for this specific stakeholder group, and can be used together
with FactSheets to foster trust.
We acknowledge that there could be additional relevant
questions that were not listed in our FactSheet template that
might be useful for application transparency in this context.
We suggest the FactSheet template as a useful starting point
in the efforts towards transparency.
We also acknowledge that as applications are updated,
the answers to the questions may change. We suggest the
generation of a FactSheet for each application deployment
and update. It is possible to create a base FactSheet for
the application that covers the details that will not change
from one application instance to the other, and also include a
supplementary FactSheet that is generated for each version or
use case.
We have demonstrated the potential of FactSheets in this
context to promote transparency but note that FactSheets are
not limited to this purpose alone. They can be leveraged as
a mechanism in additional contexts, for example as part of a
robust trust and governance strategy within a business, or a
path for evaluation and certification of models or services by
a third-party.
8IX. CONCLUSION
Our proposal of the use of FactSheets for transparency will
help in providing consumable details about the applications
for the stakeholder groups we discussed in Section III and
help each group to understand application details related to
the concerns of their group.
We encourage people with an interest in fostering trust in
models, services and applications to use transparent reporting
techniques like FactSheets to provide consumers and stake-
holder groups with the necessary details to better understand
these technologies.
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